Are Virtue Ethics Compatible with Torah Thought?

This is the second part of a series looking at whether different types of normative ethics are compatible with Torah thought. You can read the first part on consequentialism here.

While deontological ethics looks at whether actions are right or wrong, and consequentialism examines the outcomes of those actions, virtue ethics emphasizes the importance of developing good character traits. According to virtue ethics, being a virtuous person matters more than just the specific actions or their results – it’s about focusing on the individual’s character and moral qualities. Does Torah thought say the same thing? In this essay, we will explore some key ideas from Aristotle’s virtue ethics and see how they align with Torah values.

What Are Virtue Ethics?

In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle reasons that behaving morally involves not only doing certain actions but carrying them out in a particular way. He explains, โ€œWhatever deeds arise in accord with the virtues are not done justly if they are merely in a certain state, but only if he who does those deeds is in a certain state as well.โ€ Aristotle then proceeds to list three requirements that one must meet in order to be truly virtuous. Letโ€™s take a look at each category and analyze what the Jewish perspective on it is. 

Requirement 1: A Person Must Act Knowingly 

According to this, actions are not considered fully virtuous if done accidentally or if a person isnโ€™t mindful when carrying out the act. An individual must be consciously aware of what actions they are doing and why they are doing them. This emphasizes the importance of conscious awareness, understanding, and intentionality in moral actions.

A child might put a coin in a charity box because that is what they have seen their parents do. However, if as they reach their teenage years, their moral understanding does not develop and they continue to give money in the same way out of unthinking habituation, this person could hardly be labeled as virtuous as their moral understanding is incomplete. They do not have a clear knowledge of the moral activity in which they are participating. In order for an individual to be truly virtuous, their understanding of the good deed must increase through repeated performance.

In the book of Isaiah (29:13), the Prophet delivers a rebuke to his people, saying: 

ื•ึทื™ึนึผึฃืืžึถืจ ืึฒื“ึนื ึธึ—ื™ ื™ึทึšืขึทืŸ ื›ึดึผึคื™ ื ึดื’ึทึผืฉืึ™ ื”ึธืขึธึฃื ื”ึทื–ึถึผึ”ื” ื‘ึฐึผืคึดึคื™ื• ื•ึผื‘ึดืฉึฐื‚ืคึธืชึธื™ื•ึ™ ื›ึดึผื‘ึฐึผื“ึ”ื•ึผื ึดื™ ื•ึฐืœึดื‘ึผึ–ื•ึน ืจึดื—ึทึฃืง ืžึดืžึถึผึ‘ื ึดึผื™ ื•ึทืชึฐึผื”ึดึคื™ ื™ึดืจึฐืึธืชึธืึ™ ืึนืชึดึ”ื™ ืžึดืฆึฐื•ึทึฅืช ืึฒื ึธืฉึดืึ–ื™ื ืžึฐืœึปืžึธึผื“ึธึฝื”ืƒ

My Sovereign said: Because that people has approached [Me] with its mouth And honored Me with its lips, But has kept its heart far from Me, And its worship of Me has been a social obligation, learned by rote

This very expression – mitzvot anashim melumada – condemns the superficiality of the people’s worship. Despite outwardly expressing reverence and adherence to religious practices, their inner spiritual condition does not align with genuine faith and devotion. 

Thus, in Jewish thought, mitzvot cannot be performed out of habit or routine without deep understanding or genuine intentionality. This point would seem to align with the first principle of virtue ethics that a person must be mindful and have an understanding of the virtuous acts they are performing.

Requirement 2 – A Person Must Act by Choosing the Actions in Question for Their Own Sake

The second requirement is that the individual must not have an ulterior motive when carrying out a given action. Therefore if a person does a generous action, but they are driven by honor-seeking motivations and their own personal gain, according to Aristotleโ€™s approach, they would not be considered a virtuous person. Instead, one must want to do a generous action because it is the right thing to do. The person must also value virtues for their own sake and not merely as a means to an end (as is the case with consequentialism).

From a Torah perspective, it is of crucial importance that a person works to cultivate the right intentions. The Chovot HaLevavot – Duties of the Heart – explains, โ€œThe duties of the limbs cannot be performed properly unless they are accompanied by the will of the heart, longing of the soul to do them, and desire of the heart to perform them.โ€1 That being said, while having the right intention is important, the bottom line is that the performance of the mitzvot takes priority. The Nefesh HaChaim (prologue to Gate Four) explains:

The essential part of every mitzvah is the performance; purity of intention is of secondary concern. And so the Gemara in Nidda 23a says that a glutton who gorges himself on the korban Pesach, although he has not done the mitzvah in the preferred way, has indeed fulfilled the mitzvah. And a person who has the loftiest and purest kavanot about the korban Pesach but neglects to prepare it incurs kareit. The same applies to all mitzvot. [Performing the mitzvah is what counts.]

Each action is made up of two components maโ€™aser (the action itself) and machshava (the intention that accompanies it). Even if a person performs a mitzvah but not in the virtuous manner that they are supposed to – with the right machshava, this doesnโ€™t in any practical sense negate their mitzvah observance.

Requirement 3 – A Person Must Act While Being in a Steady and Unwavering State

Thirdly, a personโ€™s behavior must manifest itself as part of a consistent disposition. If a person has a generous feeling triggered by a sentimental song they have just heard, for example, and then acts upon it, their generous action would be an irregular occurrence as they do not typically feel or act in this generous fashion. The virtuous person, unlike the person in this example, however, must act in a reliable manner.

In Judaism, we donโ€™t hold that it is all or nothing. That a person is either a virtuous person or they are not. That a person is either acting with the right intentions or the wrong ones. It is very challenging, if not impossible, for individuals to consistently behave or perform in a completely dependable or predictable way over an extended period. We acknowledge that people have a complex mix of motivations: sometimes weโ€™ll want to do the right thing, other times weโ€™ll want to do the wrong thing and other times weโ€™ll want to do the right thing but for the wrong reasons. 

Any good act that a person does has an intrinsic value to it, irrespective of the consistency of the individual’s behavior. Perhaps the person overcame a great inner struggle to perform that good action, in which case it would be a very significant and meritorious thing for them to do.

In conclusion, the fundamental question of virtue ethics – “What kind of person should I be?” can be seen to penetrate the source of moral inquiry deeper than questioning “What should I do?” This is in line with Torah thought, where the fundamental goal of the mitzvot is to turn us into more Godly people. That being the case, even if a person doesnโ€™t approach the mitzvot in the correct way, their observance nevertheless has intrinsic value.

  1. Introduction โ†ฉ๏ธŽ